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Incentives and Risks in Relationships Between the Principal and the Agent 
Vigen Minasyan1 
 
 
The paper addresses a basic model of moral hazard (risk) [Gibbons, 2010; Gibbons, 2005] and 
suggests some of its modifications. In the basic model of moral risk, questions are put and 
examined that have not been considered in the previous researches. In particular, it is proved 
that the level of agent's efforts that maximizes its expected utility coincides with the level of 
efforts that minimize the risk of obtaining this maximum utility. Modifications of the moral 
risk model are considered where the optimal behavior of the principal and the agent 
considerably differ from the respective behavior in the moral risk model. 
The paper introduces moral risk measures VaR for the principal and VaR for the agent that 
specify the qualitative assessments of risk on the part of the principal and the agent in their 
relationships.  
 
Keywords: model of moral hazard (risk), expected utility, VaR for the principal, VaR for the 
agent, measure of the utility risk, lognormally distributed random variable. 
 
1. Basic model of moral risk 
 
With the agent not inclined to risk, the principal's (employer's) choice of the incentives' force 
is defined by a tradeoff between the incentives and the insurance. 
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The basic model of moral risk considers interaction between the principal and the agent 
(employee). The agent makes unobservable (hence uncontrollable) by the principal effort a 
aimed at obtaining result y  (which is usually considered as gain). Obtaining of this result 
depends not only on the agent's efforts, but also on the influence of random factors leading to 
uncertainty of the result. The realized value y is the value observable by the principal and is a 
basis for building an incentive contract from the principal to the agent. 
Relationships between the principal and the agent are built in the following sequence 
(Gibbons R., 2010; Gibbons R., 2005). 
1. The principal and the agent conclude a contract )(yw  that fixes the pattern and value 
of remuneration. 
2. The agent chooses an action, with real influence on the result of size a, but the 
principal has no information about the choice made by the agent (i.e. he "observes" 
neither the actual choice of the agent nor its result a ). 
3. Some random events take place that lead to a random contribution to the result, of 
value  , not controllable by the agent. 
4. As a result of the agent's actions a and a random contribution to result  , the value of 
result (production function) y is defined. 
5. The agent receives a remuneration stipulated in the contract. 
 
The basic model of moral risk also makes the following additional suggestions (Gibbons R., 
2010; Gibbons R., 2005). 
 The production function is linear:  ay , where  - normally distributed random 
value with a zero mean and variance 2 . 
 The incentive contract is also linear: bysyw )( , where s corresponds to the value 
of the fixed remuneration, and coefficient b corresponds to the force of the set 
incentives. 
 The agent has a constant absolute disinclination to risk, i.e. his utility function looks 
like 
xR
A
Aexu
)( , where x is a value of the agent's net gain, 0AR is a constant 
coefficient of the agent's absolute disinclination to risk. 
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 Net (monetary) gain of the agent is equal to the difference between the obtained 
remuneration and the subjective monetary valuation (on the part of the agent) of the 
costs of making efforts )(acwx  , where )(ac is a convex function. 
 The principal is neutral to the risk and hence seeks only maximization of the expected 
value of his own return, )( wyEE  . 
 
The agent can maximize the expected utility for himself with the help of choosing effort a. I.e. 
his choice corresponds to the solution of the following optimization problem: to determine 
value *aa  , at which ))((max auE A
a
 is reached. 
As is known (Gibbons R., 2010; Gibbons R., 2005), the optimal level of the agent's efforts 
represented as )(* ba  is the solution of equation bac  )( , and the certainty equivalent 
(agent's gain) CE with efforts' level )(* ba is: 
.
2
1
)]([)(),( 22** bRbacbbasbsCE A  
 
The expected benefit of the principal with such a choice of the agent is: 
sbabbsE  )()1(),( * . 
The basic model of moral risk suggests that thought the principal's aim is the maximization of 
his expected benefit, the company considers the aim of maximizing the total gain of the 
principal and the agent, defined in the form of a sum of a certainty equivalent of the agent and 
the expected benefit of the principal: 
.
2
1
)]([)(),(),( 22** bRbacbabsEbsCE A  
The company has an opportunity to solve this optimization problem with the help of choosing 
a parameter of incentives force in contract b . As is known (Gibbons R., 2010; Gibbons R., 
2005), the optimal value of the incentives force is determined by formula: 
.
1
1
2
*
cR
b
A



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Since 2,AR  and c   are positive, value 
*b  will lie between a zero (full insurance for the 
agent) and a one (the agent receives the entire earning). 
Moreover, value *b  is the lesser, the…: 
(1) higher is the agent's degree of disinclination to risk AR ; 
(2) higher is the degree of uncertainty 2 ; 
(3) faster grow the marginal costs of making effort c  . 
It is suggested that the principal may be unaware of these values. 
It is interesting to note that if the subjective monetary valuation (on the part of the agent) of 
the cost of making efforts linearly depended on the made effort, i.е. kaсac  0)( , then, first 
of all, from the condition bac  )(  it would follow that bk  , i.e. baсac  0)( . Moreover, it 
turns out that 1* b , i.e. it is optimal to transfer the entire result to the agent (selling the 
business to the agent). 
 
2. Additional research of the basic model of moral risk 
 
А) Minimization of the utility risk for the agent 
The agent, apart from the intention to maximize the expected utility for himself, may also set 
other aims. Let us suppose that the agent's disinclination to risk is reflected in the fact that he 
chooses such efforts that minimize the risk of his utility. As a measure of the utility risk for 
the agent may be used the variance of his utility: 
222 )))((()))((())(( xuExuExu AAA  , 
where .)(
xR
A
Aexu
  
The net monetary gain of the agent is  
 bacbasacabsacwx  )()()()( , 
where is a normally distributed value with mean value 0 and variance 2 (which is usually 
written as ),0( 2 N ). 
This is why the expected value of the agent's net monetary gain is equal 
to )()( acbasxE  , and its standard deviation is .)(  bx   From the above and from the 
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form of the utility function for the agent it follows that variable )(xuA is a lognormally 
distributed random value. It follows from the fact that 
)),((
))(ln(
bacbasNx
R
xu
A
A 

 . 
But then ))),((())(ln( bRacbasRNxu AAA  . 
However, for any lognormally distributed random value X are known (see, for example, 
(Ayvazyan S.A., MkhitaryanV.S. 2001)) the formulas for its expected value and variance: 
2
2
)(


 eXE , ,)1()(
22 22   eeX  
where  - mean value of the respective normally distributed value (i.e. ln(X)), and 2 - its 
variance. 
Applying these formulas in our case to random variable )(xuA , we obtain: 
2
))((
222
))((
bR
acbasR
A
A
A
exuE

 , 
222222 ))((22 )1())((
 bRacbasRbRA
AAA eexu
 , 
or 
,))((
]
2
))([
22bR
acbasR
A
A
A
exuE

                                                                              (1) 
.)1())((
222222 2))((22  bRbRacbasRA
AAA eeexu
                                                           (2) 
Applying the necessary minimum condition to (2), we obtain that an optimal level of the 
agent's efforts, represented as )(* ba , is the solution of equation bac  )( , which coincides 
with the equation that determines the optimal level of the agent's efforts maximizing its 
expected utility level. 
Thus, the following statement is proved. 
 
Statement 1 
The level of the agent's efforts that maximizes his expected utility coincides with the level of 
efforts that minimize the risk of obtaining this maximum utility. And this level of 
efforts )(* ba is a solution of equation bac  )( . 
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Thus, the agent, maximizing his expected utility, automatically minimizes the risk of failure 
to achieve this utility. 
 
B) Maximization of the utility of the total result of the principal and the agent and 
minimization of the risk of this utility 
 
In the basic model of moral risk, the company only considers the aim to maximize the total 
gain of the principal and the agent presented as a sum of the certainty equivalent of the agent 
and the expected benefit of the principal. 
Let us assume that the agent's interests coincide with the principal and company's interests.  
In this case both the company and the agent are interested in the total result of the agent and 
the principal. 
Since for the agent the result is )(acbysx  , and for the principal it is bysy  , then 
the total result is 
.)()(  acaacyxz  
Obviously, without any assumptions of disinclination to risk, the expected total result will be 
equal to )()( acazE  , and its dispersion will be .2  
Thus, the expected total result turns out to be independent of coefficient b – the force of the 
set incentives. 
If the interests of the agent and the company coincide, he will choose the effort that 
maximizes the total result. It is obvious that in this case the level of the agent's efforts 
presented as *a is a solution of equation 1)(  ac and the risk of result doesn't depend on efforts 
of the agent.  
Now, let us assume for the company some absolute disinclination to risk with a utility 
function looking like zRc
cezu
)( , where z – the value of net total gain of the company, 
0сR - the constant coefficient of the company's absolute disinclination to risk. 
From the above and from the form of the utility function it follows that variable )(zuс is a 
lognormally distributed random variable. It follows from the fact that 
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)),((
))(ln( 2acaNz
R
zu
c
с 

 . 
But then ))),((())(ln( 22cAc RacaRNzu  . 
However, for any lognormally distributed value X are known (see, for example, (Ayvazyan 
S.A., Mkhitaryan V.S. 2001)) the formulas for its expected value and variance: 
2
2
)(


 eXE , ,)1()(
22 22   eeX  
where  - mean value of the respective normally distributed value (i.e. ln(X)), and 2 - its 
variance. 
Applying these formulas in our case to random value )(zuc , we obtain: 
2
))((
22
))((
c
A
R
acaR
c ezuE

 , 
2222 ))((22 )1())((
 AAc RacaRRc eezu
 , 
or 
,))((
]
2
))([
2c
c
R
acaR
c ezuE

                                                                                    (3) 
2222 ))((22 )1())((
 ccc RacaRRc eezu
                                                                       (4) 
If the aim is set to maximize the expected utility for the company, then, again, the required 
condition for achieving this optimal expected utility is fulfillment of equation 1)(  ac . 
Disinclination of the agent (and hence, in this case, of the company as well) to risk is reflected 
in the fact that he chooses such efforts that minimize the risk of his utility. As a measure of 
the utility risk for the agent may be used the variance of his utility ))((2 zuс . 
Applying the necessary minimum condition, we obtain that an optimal level of the agent's 
efforts, represented as *a , is the solution of equation 1)(  ac , which coincides with the 
equation that determines the optimal level of the agent's efforts maximizing its expected 
utility level. 
Thus, the following statement is proved. 
 
Statement 2 
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In case of coincidence of the interests of the agent and the company, the level of the agent's 
efforts maximizing the expected utility of the total result coincides with the level of efforts 
minimizing the risk of obtaining this maximum utility. And this level of efforts *a  is a 
solution of equation 1)(  ac . 
 
Thus, the agent, maximizing his expected utility, automatically minimizes the risk of failure 
to achieve this utility. 
 
C) The principal and the agent maximize the utility for themselves having agreed upon 
the monetary valuation of the efforts on the part of the agent 
 
Now let us consider the case when both the principal and the agent, each attempts to 
maximize the expected utility for himself, having agreed upon the monetary valuation of the 
efforts on the part of the agent, i.e. in the form of function c(a). 
As we have already ascertained, when attempting to maximize the expected utility for 
himself, the maximally disinclined to risk agent will make effort )(* ba  satisfying 
equation .))(( * bbac   At the same time, as it was shown above, the agent automatically 
minimizes the utility risk for himself.  
The gain for the principal is )1()1( bsbabysy   , 
The expected gain of the principal is equal to sbabbsE  )()1(),( * , and the variance of 
this gain is equal to .)1()( 222  b  
If in this case the principal wishes to maximize the expected utility for himself, he will choose 
an optimal value of incentive force *b from condition 
.0))()(1()()( **  babbaE  
However, from bbac  ))(( *  it follows that 1))((ac *  a , hence .
1
))(( *
c
ba

   
Therefore, the condition of optimality of the incentive force is presented in the form of 
equation for determining *b : 
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.
)(
1
)1()(*
bс
bba

  
By the way, from this it is seen that if the principal wishes, in the given conditions, to 
minimize the risk for himself, choosing as a value risk the variance of his gain, he should 
choose the value of set incentives .1b  
I.e. he should transfer the entire earning  to the agent or, in other words, it is more profitable 
for the principal to sell the company to the agent. 
Now, let us assume for the principal some absolute disinclination to risk with a utility 
function looking like 
 Reu )( , where - the value of net total gain of the principal, 
0R - the constant coefficient of the principal's absolute disinclination to risk. 
From the above and from the form of the utility function for the principal it follows that 
variable )( u is a lognormally distributed value. It follows from the fact that 
))1(,)1((
))(ln( 22* bsbaN
R
u




 . 
But then ))1(),)1((())(ln( 222* bRsbaRNu A   . 
However, for any lognormally distributed value X are known (see, for example, (Ayvazyan 
S.A., Mkhitaryan V.S. 2001)) the formulas for its expected value and dispersion: 
2
2
)(


 eXE , ,)1()(
22 22   eeX  
where  - mean value of the respective normally distributed value (i.e. ln(X)), and 2 - its 
dispersion. 
Applying these formulas in our case to random value )( u , we obtain: 
2
)1(
))1((
222
*
))((
bR
sbaR
euE





 , 
222*222 )1())1((2)1(2 )1())((
 bRsbaRbR eeu 
  , 
or 
,))((
]
2
)1(
)1([
22
* bRsbaR
euE





                                                                                  (5) 
])1())1((2[)1(2
22*222
)1())((
 bRsbaRbR eeu 
                                                             (6)                                                                          
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If the aim is set to maximize the expected utility for the principal, then the required condition 
for achieving this optimal expected return is fulfillment of equation  
 
0)1()1()()( 2  
 bRbaba . 
Since in our case  
)(
1
))((
bc
ba

  we receive that  
2)1()1(
)(
1
)( bRb
bс
ba 

 
 . 
The solution of this equation *b will in these conditions be an optimal for the principal, from 
the point of view of maximizing the expected utility for himself, value of the incentive force. 
 
D) Determining the optimal level of the agent's efforts for particular kinds of subjective 
monetary valuation of the costs of making efforts 
 
1. Let us suggest that the function of subjective monetary valuation of the costs of making 
efforts is linear: aссac 10)(  . 
А) If the interests of the agent and the principal do not coincide, the necessary condition of 
optimality of the agent's actions looks like bac  )( , from which it follows that bс 1 and the 
function of subjective monetary valuation of making efforts looks like bacac  0)( .  
With such a function of subjective monetary valuation of making efforts and the agent's 
absolute disinclination to risk, any effort of agent a maximizes the expected utility for himself 
and minimizes the risk of utility for himself. 
B) If the interests of the agent and the principal coincide, the necessary condition of 
optimality of the agent's actions looks like 1)(  ac , from which it follows that 11 с  and the 
function of subjective monetary valuation of making efforts looks like acac  0)( .  
With such a function of subjective monetary valuation of making efforts and the agent's 
absolute disinclination to risk, any effort of agent a maximizes the expected utility of the total 
result and minimizes the risk of obtaining this maximum utility. 
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C) If the principal and the agent, independently, attempt to maximize the expected utility for 
himself, then from the condition of maximizing utility for the agent bac  )(  we obtain 
that bс 1 and the function of subjective monetary valuation of making efforts looks 
like bacac  0)( . And the condition of optimality of incentive force
*b  for the principal, 
written as )()1(1)()( 2* bcbRbbсba    , leads to the conclusion that it would be 
optimal for the principal to choose incentive force 1* b , i.e. it is optimal to transfer the entire 
result to the agent (selling the business to the agent). 
 
 
 
2. Let us suggest that the function of subjective monetary valuation of the costs of making 
efforts is quadratic: 2210)( acaссac  , where .0,0,0 210  ccc  
А) If the interests of the agent and the principal do not coincide, the necessary condition of 
optimality of the agent's actions for maximization of the expected utility for himself and 
minimization of the risk of this utility looks like bac  )( , from which it follows 
that baс  *21 с2 , and hence the value of the agent's optimal effort is
2
1*
2c
cb
a

 . This 
optimal solution exists when 1cb  and does not exist otherwise. As we know, the optimal 
value of the incentive force on the part of the company maximizing the total gain of the 
principal and the agent is determined by the formula: 
.
1
1
2
*
cR
b
A



In our case, we obtain the following expression .
21
1
2
2
*
cR
b
A
  
B) If the interests of the agent and the principal coincide, the necessary condition of 
optimality of the agent's actions looks like 1)(  ac , from which it follows that 1с2 *21  aс , 
and hence the value of the agent's optimal effort is
2
1*
2
1
c
c
a

 . This optimal solution exists 
when 10 1  c and does not exist otherwise. This effort simultaneously maximizes the value 
of the utility of the total gain and its risk. 
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C) If the principal and the agent, independently, attempt to maximize the expected utility for 
himself, then from the condition of maximizing utility for the agent bac  )( we obtain 
that baсс  *21 2  and hence the value of the agent's optimal effort is
2
1*
2c
cb
a

 . This optimal 
solution exists when 1cb  and does not exist otherwise. And the condition of optimality of 
incentive force *b  for the principal
)(
1
)1()(*
bс
bba

  leads to ,
2
1
2 22
1
c
b
c
cb 


from which it 
follows that .
2
1 1* cb

  Thus, if the company knows the method of monetary valuation by the 
agent of his efforts, such a choice of the incentive force is optimal for the principal. Let us 
note that from condition 1cb   it follows that ,
2
1
1
1 с
c


i.e. .10 1  c  Only with such values 
of 1c the described optimizations of the interests of the agent and the principal is possible. 
If the principal shows an absolute disinclination to risk  a condition of an optimality of power 
of incentives *b  for the principal  
 2)1()1(
)(
1
)( bRb
bс
ba 

 
  results in equality 
 ,)1(
2
1
2
2
22
1 bR
c
b
c
cb




  from where follows that 
)1(2
21
2
2
2
21







Rc
Rcc
b  . 
We will notice that from a condition 1cb  , follows that 12
2
2
21
)1(2
21
c
Rc
Rcc







 i.e. 
0)21)(1( 221  Rcc . 
This inequality is equivalent to simultaneous performance of two conditions. Or 10 1  c  
   and 
22 2
1
0


R
c or 11 c  and  22 2
1


R
c . 
Only at such values 1c  and 2c  the described optimization of interests of the agent and the 
principal is possible. 
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3. Let us suggest that the function of subjective monetary valuation of the costs of making 
efforts is exponential: aeac )( , where .0,0    
А) If the interests of the agent and the principal do not coincide, the necessary condition of 
optimality of the agent's actions for maximization of the expected utility for himself and 
minimization of the risk of this utility looks like bac  )( , from which it follows 
that be a 
* , and hence the value of the agent's optimal effort is )ln(
1*

b
a  . This 
optimal solution exists when b and does not exist otherwise. As we know, the optimal 
value of the incentive force on the part of the company maximizing the total gain of the 
principal and the agent is determined by the formula: 
.
1
1
2
*
cR
b
A



Т.к. aeс 2 , то beaс
b
  
)ln(
2*)(  In our case we obtain the 
following equation 
*2
*
1
1
bR
b
A 
  for determining optimal value of the incentive force. 
This equation is a quadratic equation of form: 
.0122 bbRA   Positive and making sense solution of this equation has the form: 
.
2
411
2
2
*


A
A
R
R
b

  
It is easy to verify that this value satisfies the natural conditions: .10 *  b  
B) If the interests of the agent and the principal coincide, the necessary condition of 
optimality of the agent's actions looks like 1)(  ac , from which it follows that 1
*
ae , and 
hence the value of the agent's optimal effort is )ln(
1* 

a . This optimal solution exists 
when 1 and does not exist otherwise. This effort simultaneously maximizes the value of 
the utility of the total gain and its risk. 
C) If the principal and the agent, independently, attempt to maximize the expected utility for 
himself, then from the condition of maximizing utility for the agent bac  )(  we obtain that 
the value of the agent's optimal effort is )ln(
1*

b
a  . This optimal solution exists 
when b and does not exist otherwise. And the condition of optimality of incentive force 
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*b  for the principal is
)(
1
)1()(*
bс
bba

 , and since baс  )( * , we 
obtain
b
b
b

1
)1()ln(
1
  , from which it follows that .
1
)ln(
b
bb 


Thus, if the company 
knows the method of monetary valuation by the agent of his efforts, then, solving this 
transcendental equation numerically, the principal finds out the optimal incentive force for 
himself. 
If the principal shows an absolute disinclination to risk  a condition of an optimality of power 
of incentives *b  for the principal  
 2)1()1(
)(
1
)( bRb
bс
ba 

 
  results in equality 
2)1(
1
)1()ln(
1


bR
b
b
b
  . Thus, if the company knows the method of monetary 
valuation by the agent of his efforts, then, solving this transcendental equation numerically, 
the principal finds out the optimal incentive force for himself. 
  
4.   Let us suggest that that the function of subjective monetary valuation of the costs of 
making efforts is power function : kaac  )( , where .0,0,0  k  
А) If the interests of the agent and the principal do not coincide, the necessary condition of 
optimality of the agent's actions for maximization of the expected utility for himself and 
minimization of the risk of this utility looks like bac  )( , from which it follows 
that bak k 1*)( , and hence the value of the agent's optimal effort is .1*  k
k
b
a

 As we 
know, the optimal value of the incentive force on the part of the company maximizing the 
total gain of the principal and the agent is determined by the formula: 
.
1
1
2
*
cR
b
A



Since 2)1(  kakkс  , then )1()()( 1
2
*  

kk
k
b
aс k
k


. In our case we 
obtain the following equation 
)1()(1
1
1
2*
2
*




kk
k
b
R
b
k
k
A 


 for determining the optimal 
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value of the incentive force. This equation is a complicated irrational equation, which can be 
solved numerically. 
B) If the interests of the agent and the principal coincide, the necessary condition of 
optimality of the agent's actions looks like 1)(  ac , from which it follows that 1)( 1* kak , 
and hence the value of the agent's optimal effort is .
1
1
*
 k
k
a

  
This effort simultaneously maximizes the value of the utility of the total gain and its risk. 
C) If the principal and the agent, independently, attempt to maximize the expected utility for 
himself, then from the condition of maximizing utility for the agent bac  )(  we obtain that 
the value of the agent's optimal effort is 1*  k
k
b
a

. And the condition of optimality of 
incentive force *b  for the principal is 
)(
1
)1()(*
bс
bba

 , and since 
1
2
* ))(1()( 

 k
k
k
b
kkaс

  then we obtain
1
2
1
1
))(1(
1
)1()(





k
k
k
k
b
kk
b
k
b



, from which, with 
the help of simple reductions, it follows that 
k
b
1*  . Since *b should satisfy natural 
condition 1* b , then if the company knows the method of monetary valuation by the agent of 
his efforts, this optimal for the principal choice of the incentive force is only possible of 
condition 1k is fulfilled. 
If the principal shows an absolute disinclination to risk  a condition of an optimality of power 
of incentives *b  for the principal  
2)1()1(
)(
1
)( bRb
bс
ba 

 
  results in equality  
2
1
2
1
1
)1(
))(1(
1
)1()( 



bR
k
b
kk
b
k
b
k
k
k 

 


   or 
1
2
2 )()1(1 

 
k
k
k
b
bRbk

 . 
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Thus, if the company knows the method of monetary valuation by the agent of his efforts, 
then, solving this transcendental equation numerically, the principal finds out the optimal 
incentive force for himself. 
 
4. Risks for certain players with various relationships between the agent and the 
principal expressed using the risk measures VaR and ES 
 
We have already considered the utility risks for the agent, the principal and the company 
(agent + principal). But of interest is considering the risk measures similar to such risk 
measures as VaR and ES, existing in the risk management (see, for example, (Crouhy M., 
Galai D., Mark R. 2011), (Hull J.C. 2007) and (Jorion P. 2007)) for assessment of asset risks, 
that have already found use in assessment of risks in other spheres (for example, see 
application of similar risk measures for project risk assessment (Limitovsky M.A., Minasyan 
V.B. 2011)). 
Let us first consider these notions for determining the risk for the agent. 
It will be recalled that a random value of the agent's gain in our model is expressed by the 
formula: .)( bacbasx   
The value at risk with confidence probability p for the agent will be a value expressed 
as
x
pVaR , such that the probability that the agent's gain will be greater than this value is equal 
to p. I.e. it is the worst of all possible values of the agent's gain that may occur with 
probability p. I.e. pVaRxP
x
p  }{ . 
As is known (see, for example, (Crouhy M., Galai D., Mark R. 2011), (Hull J.C. 2007) and 
(Jorion P. 2007)), in our suppositions, the risk measure VaR for the agent will be expressed by 
the formula: 
)()( 1,0 xkxEVaR p
x
p  , 
where E(x) – expected value of random result x for the agent, )(x - standard deviation of 
value x, and 
1,0
pk - quantile of standard normal distribution. 
It will be recalled that .)( bacbasx  Therefore, )()( acbasxE  , and .)(  bx   
Hence, we obtain this expression of risk measure VaR for the agent: 
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bkacbasVaR p
x
p
1,0)(                                                                                    (7) 
Having an idea of the form of function c(a), depending on the relationships between the agent 
and the principal, we can substitute into this expression the optimal values of *a and *b and 
calculate the value of risk measure VaR for the agent. 
Cases are possible when there is a significant probability of stress (catastrophic) scenarios 
when the results may be considerably lower than the VaR. For such situation, measure VaR is 
not always effective for measuring risks. In this case, the risk may be determined by measure 
ES. (About risk measure ES for assets see, for example, (Crouhy M., Galai D., Mark R. 
2011), (Hull J.C. 2007) and (Jorion P. 2007)). 
Conditional value at risk (expected shortfall) with confidence probability p.  
pES  – the mean resultant value which may be predicted in (1- p)% of the worst scenarios.  
As is known (see, for example, (Crouhy M., Galai D., Mark R. 2011), (Hull J.C. 2007) and 
(Jorion P. 2007)), if the resultant value is normally distributed with standard deviation  , 
then pES is calculated by the formula: 
.
)1(2
))(5,0exp( 21,0

 p
k
ES
p
p


  
It will be recalled that  .)(  bx   
Hence, we obtain this expression of risk measure for the agent: 
.
)1(2
))(5,0exp( 21,0


b
p
k
ES
px
p


                                                                                          (8) 
In case of absolute disinclination of the agent to risk with utility function xRA
Aexu
)( , of 
interest is risk measure VaR of utility for the agent. 
The value at risk with confidence probability p for the agent will be a value expressed 
as
)(xu
pVaR , such that the probability that the utility for the agent will be greater than this value 
is equal to p. I.e. it is the worst of all possible values of utility for the agent that may occur 
with probability p. I.e. pVaRxuP
xu
p  })({
)(
. 
It would be desirable to express 
)(xu
pVaR through
x
pVaR . Truth of the following absolutely 
general statement can be proved. 
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Statement 3. 
For any continuously distributed random variable x and increasing function u(x) holds the 
formula: 
)(xu
pVaR = ).(
x
pVaRu  
Proof. 
By definition of value
)(xu
pVaR , true is the equation 
pVaRxuP xup  })({
)(
. 
Since function u(x) is a increasing one, there is an inverse function expressed as ).(1 yu  Then 
it is obvious that the last equation is equivalent to the following: 
pVaRuxP xup 
 )}({ )(1 . Hence, by definition of 
x
pVaR , we obtain 
x
pVaR = ).(
)(1 xu
pVaRu

 Then 
)(xu
pVaR = ).(
x
pVaRu  
 
Since the agent's utility function xRA
Aexu
)( is a increasing one, then, applying to it 
Statement 3 and keeping in mind formula (7), we obtain the following formula for
)(xu
p
AVaR : 
.
])([)(
1,0 bkacbasRxu
p
pAA eVaR

                                                                                      (9) 
Let us consider risk measure
)(xu
p
AES  of utility for the agent.   
Using definition of
)(xu
p
AES , since the agent's utility function xRA
Aexu
)( is a increasing one, 
applying to it Statement 3 and keeping in mind formula (7), we obtain 
 ))(|)(( )()( xupAA
xu
p
AA VaRxuxuEES  ))()(|)(( xpAAA VaRuxuxuE ).|)((
x
pA VaRxxuE   
Note that condition 
x
pVaRx  is equivalent to condition 
,)()( 1,0  bkacbasbacbas p  hence .
1,0  pk  Then we have: 
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




deeES
p
AA
k
bacbasRxu
p
2
21,0
2))(()(
2
1 



 = 




 



deee
p
AA
k
bRacbasR 2
21,0
2))((
2
1
 



 





deee
p
AA
A
k
bRbR
acbasR
1,0
22
2
222 )(
2
1
2
1
))((
2
1
).( 1,0
)
2
1
)(( 22
pA
bRacbasR
kbRNe
AA




 
Therefore 
)(xu
p
AES  ).( 1,0
)
2
1
)(( 22
pA
bRacbasR
kbRNe
AA




                                                      (10) 
Here, N(x) is a function of standard normal distribution. 
Thus, if the function of monetary evaluation of the agent's efforts is known, risk 
measure
)(xu
p
AES can be calculated. 
Let us deal with risk measure VaR for the principal. 
The value at risk with confidence probability p for the principal will be a value expressed 
as

pVaR , such that the probability that the principal's gain will be greater than this value is 
equal to p. I.e. it is the worst of all possible values of the principal's gain that may occur with 
probability p. I.e. pVaRP p 
}{  
It will be recalled that the gain for the principal is )1()1( bsbabysy   , 
Expected gain of the principal is sbabbsE  )()1(),( * , and dispersion of this gain 
is .)1()( 222  b  
Hence, we obtain this expression of risk measure VaR for the principal: 
)1()1( 1,0 bksbaVaR pp 

                                                                           (11) 
Having an idea of the form of function c(a), depending on the relationships between the agent 
and the principal, we can substitute into this expression the optimal values of *a and *b and 
calculate the value of risk measure VaR for the principal. 
Let us consider risk measure 

pES  for the principal. It is obvious that the expression for this 
risk measure for the agent looks like: 
.)1(
)1(2
))(5,0exp( 21,0


b
p
k
ES
p
p 


                                                                                (12)                                 
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In case of absolute disinclination of the principal to risk with utility function 
 Reu )( , 
of interest is risk measure VaR of utility for the principal. 
The value at risk with confidence probability p for the principal will be a value expressed 
as
)(u
pVaR , such that the probability that the utility for the principal will be greater than this 
value is equal to p. I.e. it is the worst of all possible values of utility for the principal that may 
occur with probability p. I.e. pVaRuP
u
p 


 })({
)(
. 
Since the principal's utility function 
 Reu )( is  increasing one, then, applying to it 
Statement 3 and keeping in mind formula (9), we obtain the following formula for
)(xu
pVaR
 : 
])1()1([)(
1,0 bksbaRu
p
pAeVaR
                                                                                       (13) 
Let us consider risk measure
)(u
pES of utility for the principal.  
Using definition of
)(u
pES , since the principal's utility function

 
AReu )( is a increasing 
one, applying to it Statement 3 and keeping in mind formula (7), we obtain 
 
  ))(|)((
)()( u
p
u
p VaRuuEES 

 ))()(|)(( pVaRuuuE
).|)((   pVaRuE  
Note that condition 
 pVaR is equivalent to condition 
,)1()1()1()1( 1,0  bksbabsba p   hence .
1,0  pk  Then we have: 
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Therefore 
)(u
pES ).)1((
1,0
))1(
2
1
)1(( 22
p
bRsbaR
kbRNe  
 
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                           (14)                                              
Thus, if the function of monetary evaluation of the agent's efforts is known, risk 
measure
)(u
pES can be calculated.  
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Let us consider risk measure VaR for the company. 
The value at risk with confidence probability p for the company will be a value expressed 
as
с
pVaR , such that the probability that the company's gain will be greater than this value is 
equal to p. I.e. it is the worst of all possible values of the company's gain that may occur with 
probability p. I.e.  
pVaRzP cp  }{ . 
It will be recalled that the gain for the company is  )(acaz , 
Expected gain of the company is )(acaEz  , and dispersion of this gain is .)( 22  z  
Hence, we obtain this expression of risk measure VaR for the company: 
1,0)( p
c
p kacaVaR                                                                             (15) 
Having an idea of the form of function c(a), depending on the relationships between the agent 
and the principal, we can substitute into this expression the optimal values of *a and *b and 
calculate the value of risk measure VaR for the company. 
Let us consider risk measure 
с
pES  for the company. It is obvious that the expression for this 
risk measure for the company looks like: 
.
)1(2
))(5,0exp( 21,0

 p
k
ES
pс
p


                                                                               
In case of absolute disinclination of the company to risk with utility function zRc
cezu
)( , of 
interest is risk measure VaR of utility for the company. 
The value at risk with confidence probability p for the company will be a value expressed 
as
)( zu
p
cVaR , such that the probability that the utility for the company will be greater than this 
value is equal to p. I.e. it is the worst of all possible values of utility for the company that may 
occur with probability p. I.e. pVaRzuP
zu
pc
c  })({ )( . 
Since the company's utility function zRc
cezu
)( is  a increasing one, then, applying to it 
Statement 3 and keeping in mind formula (15), we obtain the following formula for
)(zu
p
сVaR : 
])([)(
1,0 pcc kacaRzu
p eVaR

                                                                                      (16) 
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Let us consider risk measure
)( zu
p
сES of utility for the company.  
Using definition of
)( zu
p
cES , since the company's utility function zRc
cezu
)( is a increasing 
one, applying to it Statement 3 and keeping in mind formula (7), we obtain 
 ))(|)(( )()( zupcc
zu
p
cc VaRzuzuEES  ))()(|)(( zpccc VaRuzuzuE ).|)((
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pc VaRzzuE   
Note that condition 
z
pVaRz  is equivalent to condition ,)()(
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Thus, if the function of monetary evaluation of the agent's efforts is known, risk 
measure
)( zu
p
cES can be calculated using formula (17).  
 
Conclusion 
 
In contractual relationships between any two or more persons, of importance is the 
specification of private rights that determines how costs and remunerations will be distributed 
among the participants of these relationships. The role of contracts as a vehicle for voluntary 
exchange is brought out in paper (Alchian A. A. and Demsetz H. 1972). We, following 
(Jensen M.C., Meckling W.H. 1976) and (Jensen M.C. 1998), consider the agent relationships 
as a contract, which, on the part of one or more persons (principal(s)), is concluded with the 
other person (agent) for rendering some service on their behalf, which includes delegation of 
some decision making authorities to the agent. If both the parties in relationships maximize 
the utility for themselves, then the agent will not always act to the best interests of the 
principal. The monetary equivalent of reduction of the principal's well-being from this 
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divergence is the cost of the agent relationships. The principal may limit the divergence of the 
agent's actions from his interests setting respective incentives through concluding additional 
contracts with the agent. An example of modeling the agent relationships is the moral risk 
model this research is based on. The paper considers relationships between the principal and 
the agent of various degrees of closeness and studies the possibility to optimize the expected 
utility and risk for each party.  
For various kinds of relationships between the principal and the agent there were obtained 
computational formulas for introduced risk measures VaR and ES both for the principal and 
the agent. 
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